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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the establishment of plurinationalism in Bolivia and its 
relationship with a rentier economy based in extractive energy resources. In the early 
2000s, Bolivia became part of a Leftist shift in governments across South America. With 
the election of Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, Bolivia cast aside neo-
liberal economic policies and nationalized many of its industries, the largest being the 
hydrocarbon and oil industry. Utilizing strong cultural and historical symbols, Morales 
gained overwhelming support from the mestizo and indigenous communities. The 
promise of self-determination and autonomy for self-identifying indigenous groups 
propelled Bolivian plurinationalism forward as the answer for change in a government 
that finally represented the traditionally repressed majority. Energy rents supported 
universal pensions, education, and maternal-infant health care; these programs became 
the primary tools for populist-style redistribution. This thesis analyzes the effectiveness 
of these social programs in establishing national cohesion and identity among the 
Bolivian population. A historical comparison of Bolivia before plurinationalism, 
announced in 2005, and during the establishment of plurinationalism, 2005–2013, is 
utilized to gauge the effectiveness of the new government policy in creating 
national cohesion. The primary finding of this thesis is that the effective impact of 
social programs on national cohesion is minimal. Instead of greater Bolivian national 
cohesion, the primary outcome of these programs is the reinforcement of the social 
divide between the Morales government supporters in the western highlands and 
autonomy seeking groups in the eastern lowlands. 
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The 2005 election of Evo Morales solidified a political and social transition in 
Bolivia, the Andes region, and South America. Bolivia’s “radical Left Turn,” a turn taken 
also in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Argentina, is defined as “the wholesale reversal of trade 
liberalization and privatization.”1  Anti-colonial attitudes and indigenous movements 
enabled this turn.2 In making the Left Turn in these countries, “The state expanded its 
control over the economy, and the presidents maximized their control over the state.”3 
As part of this Left Turn, Bolivian President Morales introduced the policy of 
plurinational governance, based on “robust redistributive social rights rooted in a strong 
state alongside equally robust indigenous rights.”4  Energy sector rents, under this policy, 
are to finance both a strong state and autonomous indigenous rights in Bolivia in order to 
diffuse conflicts between the two. Plurinationalism rests on the central government’s 
elevation of and respect for the multiple indigenous communities that exist in Bolivia, 
while at the same time forging – out of diverse populations and geographic regions – a 
consolidated Bolivian nation. 
Indigeneity is central to Morales’ policy and base of support. On the thirteenth of 
September 2007, the 107th plenary meeting of the United Nations’ General Assembly 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 
The declaration and its 41 Articles, “[affirmed] that indigenous peoples are equal to all 
other peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider 
themselves different, and to be respected as such.”5  Indigenous rights finally became an 
international institution. 
                                                 
1 Sebastian L. Mazzuca, “The Rise of Rentier Populism,” Journal of Democracy 24, no.2 (2013): 108. 
2 Miguel Centellas, “Cycles of Reform: Placing Evo Morales’s Bolivia in Context,” Latin American 
Research Review 50, no. 1 (2015): 229. 
3 Ibid., 109. 
4 Bret Gustafson, “Manipulating Cartographies: Plurinationalism, Autonomy, and Indigenous 
Resurgence in Bolivia,” Anthropological Quarterly 82, no. 4 (2009): 991. 
5 United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007 (New York: 
United Nations, 2008), 1. 
 2 
The first country to approve the U.N. declaration was Bolivia. Evo Morales, an 
Aymara and the first Bolivian president of indigenous background, stated: 
We are the first country to turn this declaration into a law and that is 
important, brothers and sisters. We recognize and salute the work of our 
representatives. But if we are to remember the indigenous fight clearly, 
many of us who are sensitive would end up crying in remembering the 
discrimination, the scorn.6  
Article 6 of the declaration states that, “Every indigenous individual has the right to a 
nationality.”7  This thesis will address this individual right of nationality through a case 
study of Bolivia and the country’s use of hydrocarbon energy rents to support social 
programs.  
The driving research question for this thesis is whether redistribution of wealth 
from the Bolivian energy sector to society is creating national solidarity among Bolivia’s 
ethnic and indigenous populations, or is maintaining, escalating, or creating ethnic 
division. The thesis’ central hypothesis, enshrined in the rhetoric of Morales’ 
“plurinationalism,” is that these national social programs should increase feelings of 
national solidarity and identification with what Morales has declared to be The 
Plurinational State of Bolivia.  
Non-homogenous countries rich in natural resources such as Bolivia often face 
instability associated with identity politics. Will Bolivia go the way of other extractive-
resource-based nations, such as Nigeria?  In Nigeria “the oil boom led to an ethnicization 
of politics and the manipulation or regional provinces – designed neither for freedom nor 
equality but to defuse challenges to the centralized regime.”8  Scholars find that, “in 
ethnically diverse societies, economic issues are almost always at the same time ethnic 
issues.”9  Bolivia too is facing rising tensions in the ethnic and political arenas. With 
respect to Bolivia, Bret Gustafson states that, “the question is whether plurinationalism 
                                                 
6 Headlines, “Bolivia Approves U.N. Declaration of Indigenous Rights,” Democracy Now!, accessed 
April 06, 2016, http://www.democracynow.org/2007/11/9/headlines. 
7 United Nations, “UNDRIP,” 5. 
8 Ibid., 1010. 
9 Stuart Kaufman, “Ethnicity as a Generator of Conflict,” in Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict, 
ed. Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff (New York: Routledge, 2011), 95.  
 3 
can reconcile both indigenous rights and strong state sovereignty, while avoiding new 
exclusions (and violence) associated with territorializing modes of ethno cultural 
differences and with hypernationalist states.”10 
The analysis and empirical evidence of this thesis is presented in four chapters. 
Chapter I addresses the relationship between Bolivia and the myriad ethnic and 
indigenous identities of its population. The methods, hypothesis, and design of the 
research are presented in the first chapter. The contextual definitions of the terms 
ethnicity and indigenous will be explored at the end of the chapter.  
Chapter II will discuss the historical background of Bolivian indigenous identity. 
This chapter will focus on the interaction between political power and social organization 
from the pre-European era until the modern era of the twenty-first century. 
Chapter III analyzes the characteristics of Bolivian national identity. The Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) provides bi-annual data, starting in 1998 until 
2014, on key elements that address national identity and cohesion: ethnic self-
identification, indigenous association, trust in municipal and central governments, levels 
of victimization, and social mobilization, i.e., protests and public demonstrations. 
Secondary literature on Bolivian identification supports the analysis, as well. 
Chapter IV will compare pre-2005 and 2005 - 2013 energy resource rent 
redistribution practices. Historically Bolivian social programs were paid from mining 
funds; in 2009, with the Bolivian Constitution referendum, funds for social programs 
were to be allocated exclusively from hydrocarbon and natural gas rents.  
A. BOLIVIA’S LEFT TURN: NATIONALIZATION AND 
PLURINATIONALISM 
President Morales, a popular figurehead who once led the cocaleros [coca leaf 
growers] workers’ movement, has profited greatly from indigenous social movements 
and anti-colonial attitudes toward transnational corporations operating in Bolivia. His 
passage of the Hydrocarbon Laws of 2005 marked a turning back of Bolivia’s energy 
                                                 
10 Gustafson, “Manipulating Cartographies,” 991–992. 
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sector toward nationalization. The Bolivian energy sector, “natural gas, in particular” has 
“become the backbone of the macroeconomy as well as a primary source of social 
conflict.”11   
The Morales policy of nationalized energy resources has “allowed the state to 
capture a larger share of the economic rents generated by extraction.”12  The 2005 law 
reflects changing elite attitudes towards Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which has 
increased over Morales’ time in office. In 2013, FDI accounted for 34 percent of 
Bolivia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).13  A 2013 total of $1.3 billion dollars in FDI 
entered Bolivia in the energy sector for investment in hydrocarbons, mining (lithium 
deposits extraction development), industry, and electricity.14   
“These revenues,” according to Pellegrini and Arismendi, “are financing 
numerous social policies that have been initiated or have expanded since 2006 and that 
are flagships for Morales’ political agenda.”15 
Social programs supported by energy sector rent include “pensions and 
conditional cash transfers.”16  The Renta Dignidad [The Dignity Pension] is a pension 
program “financed by 27 percent approximately of the Direct Tax on Oil and Gas.”17   
Scholars suggest that the redistributive programs are imbalanced and only partially 
regulated. Pellegrini and Arismendi note that, “Tarija, the department [province or 
regional administrative unit] that produces round 70 percent of the hydrocarbon, is also 
the one that benefits the most from redistribution.”18  Although extractive energy sector 
                                                 
11 Denise Humphreys Bebbington and Anthony J. Bebbington, “Extraction, Territory, and Inequalities: 
Gas in the Bolivian Chaco,” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30, no. 1–2 (2010): 260. 
12 Lorenzo Pellegrini and Marco Octavio Ribera Arismendi, “Consultation, Compensation, and 
Extraction in Bolivia after the ‘Left Turn’: The Case of Oil Exploration in the North of La Paz 
Department,” Journal of Latin American Geography 11, no. 2 (2010): 104. 








rents are benefiting the Bolivian state, local economies seem to be experiencing uneven 
and often negative environmental and socio-economic impacts. The U.S. State 
Department stated in 2014 that, “the missing redistribution of revenues and the lack of 
compensatory policies as the local level result[ed] in unfair outcomes.”19     
Ethnic demographic division has been a prime mover in political group 
identification since pre-colonial times. 
Bolivia’s indigenous demography and societal distinctions have been studied and 
analyzed by anthropologists and other social scientists for decades. These studies have 
organized the thirty Bolivian indigenous groups into regional and linguistic areas. 
Indigenous groups are also divided between the western Andean highlands (home to the 
Aymara and Quechua peoples) and southeastern lowland basin (home to the Guarani).20   
The nationalized hydrocarbon industry creates another geographic and physical 
rift through the country. Hydrocarbon and other resource extraction under state control 
have increased Bolivia’s GDP exponentially.21  The majority of the hydrocarbon fields 
are located in the south-east (Guarani) region of the country.22  This thesis draws on the 
work of Michael Ross and others to understand the impact of government redistribution 
on whether and how Bolivia’s energy sector may affect Bolivia’s current national 
cohesion.  
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
This thesis examines the effect of government redistribution programs on 
Bolivia’s national cohesion. The proposition examined here, and underpinning Morales’ 
platform of plurinationalism, is that energy-sector-funded government programs will 
decrease ethnic stratification in Bolivia and produce a cohesive “plurinational” nation-
state with ethnic group autonomy. The causal logic of Morales’ policy is that government 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Gustafson, “Manipulating Cartographies,” 1006. 
21 U.S. State Department, “2014 Investment Climate Statement-Bolivia,” http://www.state.gov/e/eb/
rls/othr/ics/2014/228433.htm. 
22 Denise Humphreys Bebbington, “Consultation, Compensation, and Conflict: Natural Gas Extraction 
in Weenhayek Territory, Bolivia,” Journal of Latin American Geography 11, no.2 (2012): 51. 
 6 
resource-wealth distribution policy has direct effects in reducing ethnic division, 
increasing national cohesion, all the while maintaining ethnic group autonomy. The 
alternative outcomes are: these programs have no effect or they have a negative effect. 
Morales’ ideology of plurinationalism is the primary alternative explanation for any 
resulting increase in national cohesion, equal representation and support.   
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The conduct of the thesis research focuses on a single longitudinal case study: the 
impact of Bolivian energy-rent policies on social/ethnic stratification before and during 
plurinationalism. The two timeframes of Bolivia allow for comparative analysis. The first 
period is the state of ethnic and social stratification prior to the 2005 establishment of 
plurinational governance. Understanding the historical context of Bolivian ethnic division 
provides a benchmark against which to identify post-2005 changes in national cohesion, 
the second period of inquiry. The research will assess whether the state distribution of 
nationalized energy-sector rents under plurinational governance were the catalysts that 
changed minority attitudes towards greater national cohesion.  
The single case methodological approach is appropriate because it contains a 
controlled variable of the Bolivian energy sector and the observable relation it has with 
the multiple ethnic groups that compose Bolivia’s population demography.  
The analytical evidence is divided into two sets of indicators: the independent 
variable of government resource wealth policy and the dependent variable of national 
cohesion. Government resource wealth policy indicators include official declaratory 
statements regarding resource wealth distribution, official program budgetary data on 
resource wealth distribution, and non-official material on actual resource wealth 
distribution. The dependent variable indicators include secondary literature on Bolivian 
identification and public opinion surveys of self-identification as an ethnic group and/or 
Bolivian, familiarity with national languages vs. native languages, attitudes towards/
tolerance of other non-native languages and groups, attitudes of pride towards family/
region/country, attitudes towards the central government, and political party membership/
association. 
 7 
J.S. Mill’s “most-similar system design” or “method of difference” is an 
applicable method of research and analysis.23  John Gerring defines the method as 
analyzing, “few cases that are as similar as possible in all respects except the outcome of 
interest, where they are expected to vary.”24  The design is viable in comparison of cases 
separated by time and causal changes in political, economic, and social areas.25  As noted 
earlier, Bolivia pre-2005 (starting in the 1930s when Bolivia began to export oil) and the 
Bolivia of 2005 to 2013 are the two cases analyzed through the most-similar method. The 
similarities of the two periods include the number of ethnic/indigenous groups, the 
presence of energy sector economy, and democratically elected government. National 
cohesion is the outcome in question.   
The types of sources utilized for this research include both primary and secondary 
sources. The primary sources include Bolivian government documents and independent 
survey data. Government documents include the 2009 Bolivian Constitution and other 
policy doctrines pertaining to indigenous/ethnic rights and energy source control. These 
primary government sources provide the framework for how plurinationalism is defined 
in Bolivia and how redistribution of economic resources produced by the energy sector is 
implemented among the Bolivian population. Other primary sources include survey 
research on Bolivian mass attitudes from Latin American Barometer (LAPOP). 
The secondary sources utilized for thesis research includes scholarly articles, 
books, and journals. A lack of Spanish, Quechua, and other languages utilized in Bolivia 
limited the research to secondary sources written, published, and/or translated into 
English. There is a vast amount of English-language research done on Bolivia, both 
social, political, and economic, making the lack of language skills not an insurmountable 
problem, including ethnographic studies of indigenous groups in Bolivia, especially the 
groups existing in energy rich regions, i.e., the South East Lowlands.   
                                                 
23 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 209. 
24 Ibid., 210. 
25 Ibid., 211–212. 
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Both the primary and secondary sources provided the best evidence for evaluating 
the causal argument. The government documents, survey research, objective 
ethnographic studies, and scholarly articles compose the majority of the research 
materials. 
D. DEFINING ETHNICITY, INDIGENEITY, AND NATIONALISM 
The elements of human identity exist on a spectrum ranging from the individual 
psychology of a person to the normative behaviors of international institutions. Ethnicity, 
indigeneity, and nationalism are identity constructs developed through group 
socialization and behaviors. Ted Lewellen states that, “ethnicity only exists in 
relationship to other groups; isolated people would certainly have culture, but would not 
have ethnicity.”26  Ethnicity’s definition is variable and depends on the subjective view 
of those holding it. This thesis will utilize ethnicity as a factor to distinguish Bolivian 
groups’ cultural and physical attributes. This framework is based closely on Stanley 
Tambiah’s definition, where “ethnicity is a self-conscious and vocalized identity that 
substantializes and naturalizes one or more attributes…skin color, language, religion, and 
territory and attaches them to collectivities as their innate possession and myth-historical 
legacy.”27   
Indigeneity and being indigenous, like ethnicity, are social constructs. The term 
indigenous, however, ties directly to contemporary Western political and social contexts.  
Fabricant and Gustafson argue that indigeneity, “offers a cultural and knowledge-
centered challenge to conventional Western paradigms through which state 
transformations are debated.”28  Indigeneity is a term utilized in Bolivia for political 
mobilization in favor of large state institutional and structural changes. Indigenous labels 
given to organizations and political groups across Bolivia exist in the context of positive 
                                                 
26 Ted C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 2003), 166–167. 
27 Stanley Tambiah, “The Nation-State in Crisis and the Rise of Ethnonationalism,” in E.N. Wilmsen 
and P. McAllister, eds., The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in a World of Power (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 168. 
28 Nicole Fabricant and Bret Darin Gustafson, Remapping Bolivia: Resources, Territory, and 
Indigeneity in a Plurinational State (Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press, 2011), 5. 
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civil-society expansion but may exhibit “fundamentalism” or what Fabricant and 
Gustafson call “masking stasis with the rhetoric of change.”29  Further analysis of 
Bolivian indigenous political movements will be addressed in chapters II and III. 
Nationalism is very similar to the previous terms of ethnicity and indigeneity, in 
that it is also a social construct. Many assume that nationalism centers on the tangible 
elements of the state: marked physical territory and governed population within those 
geographic and politically recognized boundaries. This traditional sense of nationalism, 
which started with the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, conjoins a 
“nation” with its “state.”30  Bolivia’s current government policy of plurinationalism, 
however, is an example of how nationalism has evolved from the traditional 
“Enlightenment roots” toward a novel definition of “ethnonationalism.”31  This sets the 
stage for conflict between constituent elements of the “nation” and their “state.”  This 
conceptual conflict exists in plurinationalism between its promulgation of the rightful 
autonomy of self-identified ethnic groups of Bolivia and the centralizing, national 
identity of what constitutes a person to be Bolivian. Bolivia under Morales and 
plurinationalism is attempting to use centralized control of the hydrocarbon energy sector 
to afford the opportunity for autonomous identification, while also creating a dependency 
on, and presumably loyalty to, the centralized government for social program support. 
This conceptual context is important for individual identity data in Bolivia. National 
identity and identification in this thesis will be indicated by how an individual or group 
views their level of involvement within and satisfaction with the process of plurinational 
governance. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Tambiah, “Rise of Ethnonationalism,” 124–27. 
31 Lewellen, “Political Anthropology,” 171. 
 10 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Understanding some key periods of Bolivian history is crucial to what identities 
look like in contemporary Bolivia and whether economic payouts or political ideologies 
have been more important to the creation of a cohesive national identity. The historical 
eras analyzed will focus on the interaction between the governing body that holds power 
over the populations and the processes that lead to the changes of ethnic identities in 
present-day Bolivia. The influences on Bolivian history are complex and diverse, ranging 
from Incan and Spanish imperialism to Bolivia’s integration into the global economy of 
the day. The first period for analysis is the era of the Inca and pre-European contact. Its 
symbols of an expansive and prosperous indigenous empire, before the arrival of the 
Spanish, have become effective political and social tools for the spread of 
plurinationalism across Bolivia. The second period will address the impacts of European 
colonialism and its transformation after Independence in 1825 into an oligarchic system32 
under numerous caudillos.33  The socio-economic and ethnic stratification produced 
during the period of colonialism and independence still impacts contemporary views of 
Bolivians. Acts of rebellion, protest, and social mobilization, which began during this 
period, have become a normal part of Bolivian life, both before and during plurinational 
governance. The third section reviews the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 and the time 
period leading to today’s Bolivian plurinationalism. During this period, the desire and the 
process to produce a Bolivian national identity begin to take shape. An expansion of 
universal suffrage and cooperation between social classes begins to produce an 
undercurrent of organization that will culminate in plurinationalism during the early 
twenty-first century. 
                                                 
32 Víctor Alba, Nationalists Without Nations: The Oligarchy Versus the People in Latin America (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 52. 
33 John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America (New York: 
Norton, 2001), 125. The caudillo of Bolivia follows the traditional definition of a wealthy and popular 
landowner who utilizes patronage and violence to maintain power.   
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A.  TAHUANTINSUYU: “LAND OF THE FOUR DIRECTIONS” AND THE 
IMPACT OF THE INCA34  
The territory that encompasses modern day Bolivia was not conquered by the 
Incan ruler Topa Inca until 1471, considered the Late Inca or Empire Period.35  This late 
assimilation and lack of distinct per-Incan archaeology in the highlands of Bolivia has 
produced a view, shared by many scholars and Bolivians alike, or a pre-European Bolivia 
that is indelibly associated with the Inca, distinct from the rest of the Incan empire only in 
the use of the Aymara language.36  The contemporary use of the Incan term of 
Tahuaninsuyu implies a very positive idea of the Incan empire across the Andean region. 
It is a term used by the “Neo-Indian”37 movement across the Andes to promote “the 
idealization of pre-Hispanic society and the invention of neo-rituals.”38  Galinier and 
Molinié note that, “the finest example of [Neo-Indianism] is the Indian mobilization by 
Evo Morales… [he] was symbolically inaugurated at [the Festival of the Sun in 
Tiahuanaco] in January 2006 in identification with the cult of the Sun.”39 Given the 
importance of its symbolism and history for contemporary identity politics, this section 
discusses in detail the Incan system of imperial control over its diverse populations and 
regions, as these provide the context in which European colonialism occurred and is 
today understood. 
When Pizarro arrived to the Andes in 1532, the Inca Empire held a population 
estimated at about 5 million people40 and incorporated territory from modern day 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, and Chile.41  The Andes exhibit extreme 
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“environmental and climatic changes” along three distinct areas: the coastal deserts along 
the Pacific Ocean, the steep sierra mountains, and the montana forests leading into the 
selva, or Amazon Basin.42  Within the sierra mountains, the Incas established the 
infrastructural support that connected the major settlements and capitals. The puna 
valleys in between the high mountain ranges provided the arable land for cultivation of 
flora and fauna acclimated to the high altitudes and drastic temperature changes. The 
Incan Empire maintained a stratified socio-economic culture, which mirrored the physical 
topography of the Andes Mountain range. This culture established a network of semi-
autonomous settlements, with recognized rights to subsistence needs and distinct 
communal identities. The farther east one traveled from the imperial nucleus towards the 
Amazon basin, the more independent these settlements became.   
The Incan agriculture system utilized an “archipelago” settlement.43  John Murra 
writes that this system consisted of a populated “nucleus” city or capital that was 
supported by the “many and dispersed ecological tiers” of peripheral settlements.44    
These subsistence islands of agricultural land produced a need for labor specialization 
and continuous “caravan trading” by “colonists” known as mitmaq.45  The constant 
movement between ecological areas produced a dual identity, which Harris identifies as 
“double domicile.”46  The concept of double domicile describes the relation between an 
individual’s identity with their home communities and the larger Incan state.   
Such specialized subsistence patterns developed unique kinship and ethnic 
communities across the empire. These communities, or ayllus,47ranged in size from a few 
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dozen households to large population areas like Qollasuyu.48  Murra describes Qollasuyu 
as, “the most densely populated quarter of the Inka State,” and included the urban center 
of Tiwanaku, located just south of Lake Titicaca.49  The strongest identifier of ethnic 
ayllu association was language. Aymara and Quechua50 were the primary language 
families along the Andes. In these regions, the ruling classes of the Inca enforced a 
hierarchical public works regimen known as mit’a.51  Mit’a was a labor tax based on the 
social situation of households within semi-autonomous highland ayllus. The Inca state 
did not require tributes of cultivated goods such as livestock or crops, but established the 
system through work on communal lands and infrastructure. The only true elements that 
were direct tributary goods to the Inca ruling and religious classes were “uncultivated 
goods.”52  Analysis of Incan khipu53 (administrative cords dictating forms of tribute) 
reveals that these goods included feathers and honey gathering.54 These ceremonial 
goods were only accepted from “the unmarried young” or “those who had not yet formed 
their own household.”55  Murra further develops this specific resource tribute by stating 
that, “Nothing ‘cooked’ was owed the authority, nothing that had been cultivated or 
manufactured for the individual’s own storeroom.”56  Although the Inca allowed 
localized control of subsistence needs and a sense of cultural individuality, the elitist 
structure of Incan society was strictly enforced. Kendall states that, “Individual 
enterprises, or ambition to possess luxury goods, were greatly discouraged for 
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commoners by laws concerning private property.”57  Individuality existed only to a 
limited extent controlled by the constant presence of the Incan state.  
As the empire spread across the Andes, hierarchical managerial practices 
pressured major changes in the ayllu labor rotation system. Specialized craftsmen, aqlla 
(women) and yana (men), “worked full-time as artisans, herders, and cultivators,” for and 
under the direct control of the Inca royalty and leaders.58  This movement towards further 
labor for the elite marks a huge watershed moment. Murra states that, “Tawantinsuyu (or 
“The Land of the Four Directions,” the name for the Incan Empire) in 1500 seems to 
have been moving away from a fairly autonomous ethnic groups speaking their own 
languages, worshipping their own gods and able to provide, as an ethnic group, for most 
of their own needs” to a more direct system of rule.59  
Separated from the direct control of the Incan Empire were the people living in 
the Amazonian forests at the base of the eastern slopes of Andes. The Inca held a strong 
prejudice toward the semi-sedentary populations who lived and worked in the Amazonian 
lowlands. The forested slopes, (montana), and the Amazon Basin, (selva), provided lush 
cultivation areas for “coca, manioc, and tobacco.”60  These areas provided many goods to 
the Incas, but they feared the drastic differences in ecological composition of these areas 
from the familiar Andean valleys and mountains. Kendall describes how “the swamp and 
insect-infested rain-forest... caused much horror among the Inca….”61  The selva would 
become the Media Luna line in contemporary Bolivia that separates the Aymara and 
Quechua populations in the Andean highlands from the groups living in the Amazonian 
and Chaco lowlands. These ancient prejudices continue to this day.  
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The distinctions between Andean and highlander62 ethnicities, i.e., Aymara and 
Quechua, and groups from the Oriente,63 or eastern lowlands, remain powerful 
contemporary factors that divide identities and associations with the state. Recent 
academic and archeological studies of pre-European Amazon cultures have overturned 
the long-held assumption that lowland peoples existed in small, unsophisticated hunter-
gatherer groups. Within Bolivia and Peru, archeological sites in the lowlands reveal large 
monumental structures and ring ditches utilized for possible group rituals or gatherings.64  
William Denevan states that, “The Standard Model of simple societies (small 
autonomous villages) has been replaced by a New Model that includes complex societies 
with regionally integrated communities, relatively large populations, semi-intensive 
sustainable cultivation, and widespread but variable environmental impacts.”65  The new 
archaeological evidence completely revises the history of lowland peoples and challenges 
ingrained images of their economic and cultural backwardness. Much like the economic 
activities during Incan rule, the extractive resources of the east today are controlled, 
much like tribute, by the highland west.  
These aspects of Incan culture, i.e., communal-regional identity and societal 
stratification, are just a few details associated with the largest pre-European empire in 
South America. The contemporary knowledge of the Inca is filtered through the 
interpretations of the Spanish colonizers who began to populate the Andes after 1532. It 
is important to note the ethnocentric lens associated with the Spanish understandings of 
the Inca and how they impact Bolivian culture today. As will be discussed in detail 
below, practices of ethnic autonomy, rights to regional resources and self-identity shape 
the ethnic attitudes of indigenous Bolivians today. These ties with the Inca and the 
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colonial past explain why indigenista66 and mestizaje67 movements became such a 
powerful political tool for representation among ethnically based groups.  Looking back 
into the past for answers to the challenges of the present has spurred many successful 
social organizations. In Bolivia, the associative power with the Inca produces a sense of 
political and cultural cohesion among “Bolivian Indianist movements,” even if only the 
positive attributes of the past are accepted and recognized.68  
B. COLONIALISM, INDEPENDENCE, AND CAUDILLOISMO69 
The European colonial period begins with the dramatic removal of the Inca state’s 
power over its expansive Andean territories. The Spanish established the Viceroyalty of 
Peru, composed of Upper Peru (Bolivia), Lower Peru (Peru and Northern Chile), and the 
Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata (Argentina).70    The Spanish used the well-established 
Incan infrastructure of trans-Andean roads to connect their main concerns: silver and 
ports.71  Fifer makes clear the shift in geographical power, stating that, “Lima, not Cuzco, 
was Pizzaro’s City of the Kings; the coast, not the plateau nor the high mountain basin, 
was to focus Spain’s authority and prestige in South America, and reap the more lasting 
benefits from the resources of the interior.”72  Ayllu autonomy was cast aside. The 
natives became a work force decimated by harsh conditions. The Spanish Crown 
established encomiendas asserting the legitimacy of their resource-bound fervor through 
association with religious correctness.73   What is unique about the encomienda system in 
the Andes is that it is not based on land appropriations but on the “skilled human capital,” 
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placed under a native lord or cacique74 and associated regional subjects.75    Native 
languages and certain cultural practices survived and merged with the implementation of 
Spanish beliefs, particularly Catholicism.   
Spain, facing stiff economic competition from France and England, sought to 
extract more from its colonies. As one of the reforms to achieve this end, the reparto de 
mercancias, the “forced distribution of commodities,” raised taxes levied on the “Indians, 
mestizos, and creoles.”76  In addition, the Crown put control over Upper Peru in the 
hands of the Viceroyalty in Buenos Aires, breaking the link between local Spanish creole 
rulers in La Paz and the native population. This remoteness of rule and increased 
exploitation weakened the legitimacy of Spanish rule and set the stage for a series of 
failed rebellions in 1780, led by Tupaj Amaru II (in Peru), Tupaj Katari (in Bolivia), and 
Tomás Katari (in Bolivia), these revolts enshrined a historical myth of the radicalism of 
indigenous peasants and the passivity of, “creole, mestizo, or urban plebian allies…”77  
in contemporary Bolivian social movements. Hylton and Thomson state that, “internal 
contradictions and illegitimacy in the eyes of the Indian populace…” enabled Amaru and 
the Kataris to fill “the political vacuum and [acquire] effective governing authority as 
well as popular acclaim throughout the region.”78  The revolts spread across the Southern 
Andes, but were brutally put down by the Spanish and peninsulares, Spanish-born 
citizens who supported the Crown. The mutilated bodies of the leaders of the rebellion 
still stand as symbols of the unjustness of imperial rule.79  
  The indigenous rebellions instilled fear in the Spanish American leadership, 
made up largely of creoles, that it would lose the opportunity to dominate anti-imperial 
movements and resulting power structures. Hylton and Thompson state that, “Creoles 
occupied a strategic position in colonial society, and by assuming leadership themselves, 
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they would be able to direct restive social forces so as to achieve greater political 
representation and autonomy for American colonists and, ostensibly, for colonized Indian 
subjects.”80  Rural rebellions continued across Upper and Lower Peru. The 
republiquetas, guerrilla resistance groups dominated by mestizos, and liberal creole 
leaders, such as Murillo (who led an 1805 conspiracy and rebellion in La Paz) and 
Pumacahua (leader of an 1814 rebellion in Cuzco) led fights against Spanish loyalists. 
Indigenous support split between the organic uprisings led by the mestizos and creoles.  
These rebellions ultimately succeeded only with the intervention of outside forces 
led by Simon Bolivar and José de Sucre. Independence from Spain in 1825, as a result, 
was not a domestic product of the local population. Bolivia as an independent nation-state 
was instead constructed on the beliefs, practices, ideals, and attitudes of the foreign 
victors, not on those of the population that lived under Spanish rule before Bolivia 
existed. 
The liberal plans of Bolivar’s Gran Colombia and the establishment of the short-
lived Peru-Bolivian Confederation of 1836–1839 under Sucre clashed with the realities of 
Bolivia’s geography and well-established colonial labor institutions. Those institutions 
were composed of large agrarian farms and mining communities. As a result, a coherent 
Bolivian nation-state failed to emerge after independence. Instead, Bolivia experienced 
over fifty years of strife, leadership changes, and economic disruption. Fifer states that, 
“unanimity of aim and outlook, involving Bolivia as a whole, was very much more 
difficult to achieve” than political independence.81  The lack of communication between 
all areas of Bolivia, so central in theories of nation-building to create a fellow-feeling of 
solidarity, compounded the difficulty of creating a Bolivian nation-state.82    
Exacerbating these difficulties, from independence until 1880, endless disputes 
between former military leaders (the caudillos militares) nullified institutional reforms, 
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allowing colonial practices of patronage and tribute to continue. Between 1840 and 1849, 
Bolivia experienced “65 attempted coups d’état.”83  The caudillos took hold of Bolivia as 
the economy began to fall, due to the deteriorating relationships and wars with Peru and 
Argentina. This vying for regional power and control occurred between the creole socio-
economic groups who could afford to pay for and project their strength with para-military 
forces. The indigenous communities, or comunidades, in the meanwhile, continued to pay 
tribute to the haciendas that served as the base of power for creole caudillos vying for 
power.84  In 1868, the National Constituent Assembly composed largely of elite whites 
and creole political leaders, designated all communal land as property of the state and 
removed the tributary system. The government implemented land taxes on indigenous 
Indians, which forced them into debt and thusly into glorified slavery.85  The fall of the 
Melgarejo presidency and the disastrous War of the Pacific (1879-1880), marked the 
transfer from strict caudillo governance to government based on the political ideals of 
Liberal and Conservative parties.86 The policies toward the indigenous remained 
unchanged, however. Isolation and repression of rebellion were the plans for the 
oligarchic party system. 
C. 1898 TO 1952 
The transition from the nineteenth century into the twentieth began in 1898 when 
Bolivia entered a civil war known as The Federal War, in which the Liberal Party 
overthrew the Conservative Party that had ruled since 1880. This conflict witnessed the 
largest gathering of indigenous Aymara in support of coercive government change since 
the 1780–81 revolts led by Tupaj Amaru II. It was the first revolt in which indigenous 
peasants joined in the fighting. The Federal War was a similar struggle between 
supporters of autonomous rule and reforms for indigenous communities and the oligarchs 
supporting centralized power of the republic.   
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The war’s greatest impact was the continued conflict between the government and 
the indigenous communities. Hylton and Thomson state that, indigenous, “communities 
defined their enemies as ‘alonsistas,’ the ‘rich,’ ‘property owners,’ and those ‘in contact’ 
with haciendados.”87  The comunidades sought economic reform for the indigenous 
holdings. Liberal Party leader Pando had promised to end the assaults on their communal 
holdings by hacienda owners, but reneged. Under the new Liberal government of Pando 
(1899-1904) and Montes (1904-09; 1913–17), the oligarchic republic, however, 
continued. The Spanish-speaking elites labeled the insurgents as “blood thirsty” and 
holding an “insatiable thirst for revenge,” indigenous rebel leaders were executed and the 
communities were disarmed.88  The indigenous Aymara communities supported a 
Republican-led coup in 1920. Although the coup succeeded, their aim of promised 
autonomy secured instead the same “repression endured by the previous generation after 
the Federal War of 1899.”89   
Indian issues were a priority for the Bolivian government during the 1920s. The 
government intended to control and limit the possibility of strong indigenous rebellions, 
but unwittingly served to further radicalize the comunidades. It implemented an 
ethnocentric approach to cure the ailments of the comunidades, via “the moral and 
cultural leadership of enlightened creoles.”90  To this end, the government enacted The 
“Law of Indigenous Literacy,” in 1923.91  Indigenous literacy produced an unintended 
consequence: knowledge about social movements and ideologies viewed as radical. The 
Chayanta Rebellion in 1927 connected the poor and rural labor sectors with the educated 
urban class to form a Socialist Party that appealed to indigenous communities. Added to 
this internal pressure, global economic depression further threatened the Bolivian 
government. 
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The world depression in 1929 produced devastating economic trouble for Bolivia, 
dependent on the export market for tin. Bolivia, eyeing the possibility of resources in the 
Chaco border region with Paraguay, entered the Chaco War in 1932 that lasted until 
1935. The outcome of the war was another embarrassing defeat for Bolivia. Although the 
war was a stalemate, due to extreme exhaustion of personnel and material on both sides, 
Bolivia had no chance to successfully continue the war.   
The Chaco War produced two unique outcomes: Bolivia returned to “a highly 
traditional, underdeveloped and export-dominated economy…” post-bellum, but “in 
terms of radical ideology and union organization, [Bolivia] had become one more 
advanced than many of its neighbors.”92   
Military control was established in Bolivia after the Chaco War and produced 
some of the largest reforms ever seen in the country’s history. Disenfranchised junior 
officers embraced the movement toward radical idealism and cast aside the traditional 
and elite- centered way of identifying Bolivian society. Hylton and Thomson label this 
period of reform “Military Socialism,” which included: “social welfare legislation,” 
“mandatory unionization of the workforce,” “nationalization of Standard Oil,” and the 
1938 constitution focusing on the “social function of property.”93     
Throughout the early 1940s, rural indigenous communities began to pressure the 
government for more legitimate representation. The “Bolivian Indigenous Committee” 
and the “first National Indigenous Congress in 1945” enacted reforms to separate the 
traditional system of labor tribute to landowners and the hacienda system.94  Similar to 
the reactions to the 1868 decision to end the tributary system, the elite did not go quietly, 
as they refused to obey the laws. Demonstrations and protests spread across the country, 
both in the urban areas of “La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosi, Chuquisaca, and Tarija,” and 
rural agriculture areas.95  The 1946–47 rural protests were, according to Hylton and 
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Thompson, “the largest of the twentieth century.”96  President Enrique Hertzog 
suppressed the rebellion. With a strong right-wing hand, Hertzog incarcerated protest 
leaders and attempted to isolate protesting groups in labor camps. The major outcome of 
this period was the fusing of indigenous movements, the workers unions of the mining 
community, and the Socialist/Leftist community. In April of 1952, this group moved to 
create the largest national revolution in modern South American history.  
D. THE 1952 REVOLUTION AND BEYOND 
The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) was the central political 
figure in the 1952 revolution. The MNR began forming as a political party during the 
1930s and 1940s, from the educated middle-class in Bolivian urban centers.  The rise of 
political movements took hold of Bolivia during this time and the MNR focused on 
classes and social groups that had traditionally been subject to exploitation and exclusion 
from political involvement. Christopher Mitchell notes the MNR’s focus was “to form a 
coalition including every group in Bolivian society that would join in supporting a vague 
reformist and nationalist political program.”97  Historically, Bolivian social or political 
movements did not last long on the back of individualism. The MNR recognized the 
diversity of special interests in the country and sought to expand communication among 
many of these groups instead of focusing directly on one political ideology, 
socioeconomic class, or ethnic group. The MNR did rely on certain societal alliances: the 
Razon de Patria (RADEPA)98 and the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de 
Bolivia (FSTMB).99 RADEPA consisted of a coalition of junior officers who fought in 
the Chaco War and became disenfranchised with the elite civilian rulers, while FSTMB 
was Bolivia’s “first national mining union.”100 With such a wide area of support, the 
MNR won the presidential election of 1951. The election was overturned by the 
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government, though, due to the MNR’s association with the Partido Obrero 
Revolucionario (POR), a communist labor party. MNR supporters responded with 
violence.  
The coalition of armed political parties led by the MNR, coercively took control 
of the government in La Paz in April 1952. For the first time in Bolivian history, a 
movement of change and revolution successfully overthrew a traditional government 
steeped in colonial social stratification and large-scale repressive policies. The MNR 
focused on the spread of a true Bolivian nationalism. In it, indigenista and mestizaje 
characteristics mirrored socialist and nationalist political ideals.101  The largest economic 
change implemented by the MNR began with the nationalization of the tin industry and 
returning control of resources back to the labor unions. The most significant political 
reforms for MNR indigenous supporters came with the 1953 passing of the Decree of 
Land Reform, universal suffrage, and the availability of free education, literacy, and 
health care across the country, both rural and urban.102  
The quick expansion of large financial state programs proved too costly for the 
MNR government. Together with these expensive social programs, inflation, economic 
hardships, and dependence on maintaining external resource contracts, particularly with 
the United States, forced the MNR to divert from its revolutionary ideals. Economic 
support and anti-communist sentiments from the United States, again, underscored 
Bolivia’s reliance on external powers. In 1964, Bolivia’s government experienced a 
return back to military rule.103   
Authoritarian rule in the 1960s and 1970s divided the urban and rural leftist/
socialist alliances that had supported the 1952 Revolution. After the over throw of leftist 
General Candia by General Banzer in 1971, Bolivia took a hard right turn toward 
conservative actions. The association of leftist groups with the growing narcotics trade of 
the 1970s enabled regional and U.S. support for the conservative military junta. The 
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reaction of the left came with the development of indianismo in the arts and katarismo in 
politics, which both focused on the colonial and post-independence class-based and 
ethnic oppression of Bolivia’s majority: its indigenous peoples. Indianismo was “overtly 
anti-Western, [and] stressed separation from non-indigenous elements, and called for 
reconstruction of pre-Conquest Bolivia,” while katarismo was an expression of “ethnic 
consciousness [that] blended Marxist analysis with indigenous-rights claims.”104 
Growing leftist sympathies and a deteriorating state produced protests for the 
establishment of democracy in Bolivia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Bolivia was unprepared for democratization in 1982, when the mining labor 
unions, led by the Bolivian Workers Central (COB), and the leftist political party, 
Democratic Popular Unity (UDP), pressured the military junta to step down.105   
The mid-1980s until the early 2000s saw Bolivia undergo a massive economic 
and political transition. With little choice due to an inflation rate marked as one of the 
highest in history of “20,000 percent in 1984–1985,” the new democratic government 
enacted neoliberal actions.106  Austerity measures cut any continuing social programs, 
auctioned off the last remnants of nationally controlled industries, and weakened the 
mining economy of large resource in the western highlands.   
“Capitalization”107 and a renewed focus from the United States on the coca 
industry of the Andes, in the view of the left, projected onto Bolivia a new wave of 
imperialism. Once again large portions of the Bolivian population were not receiving the 
promised attributes of central economic reforms. Rural leftist groups, now containing the 
union expertise of dismissed mining workers, began mobilizing along a mix of 
socioeconomic and ethnic lines. The stage was set for a new political and social 
revolution in 200 of a type not yet seen in Bolivia.   
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E. TWENTY FIRST CENTURY BOLIVIA:  WATER WARS TO 
PLURINATIONALISM 
Bolivia’s indigenous groups were strengthened during the early 2000s as their 
conflicts with foreign entities involved in the privatization of water utilities and gas 
pipelines sparked a broad societal solidarity movement against transnational corporate 
control of water and gas.  
The 2000 Water Wars were a number of public demonstrations in Cochabamba 
against privatization of the urban water works during a period of water scarcity. The 
World Bank backed the state’s decision for Aquas del Tunari, Bechtel Enterprise (USA), 
and United Utilities (UK) to privatize the water works and construct a dam. Increased 
water rates sparked demonstrations that spread to other representative unions, such as the 
Teacher and Worker unions. The government was shut down and the negative publicity 
forced the private consortium to back out of the contract. Then, in 2003 the Gas Wars 
occurred when the Bolivian government sought to utilize hydrocarbon revenue to grow 
the Bolivian economy. U.S. and U.K. petroleum companies’ direct investment in the 
construction of a Pacific pipeline through Chile was at the center of the conflict. Riding 
the success of the 2000 Water War conflict, workers and indigenous groups protested the 
plan to support private industry and pressured for nationalization of the Bolivian energy 
sector.108   
It was this wide-spread social mobilization for nationalization of the hydrocarbon 
industry that Evo Morales used to win election in December 2005 and implement nation-
wide social programs. Along with agrarian land reform measures and constitutional 
reconstruction, the Morales presidency and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) 
political party acted on long- established attitudes and feelings of anti-colonialism and 
indianismo.  
Morales has transformed Bolivia in significant ways, establishing what Sebastian 
Mazzuca describes as, “a new and intensely plebiscitarian version of 
“superpresidentialism” in which the president dominates the entire decision-making 
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process at the expense of the national legislature and receives nothing more than nominal 
scrutiny from other branches of government or nonpartisan oversight agencies.”109 
As part of this “rentier populism,”110 Morales has relied not only on the program 
of plurinationalism and the support of indigenous communities, but on an enormous 
expansion of the state. According to Mazzuca, “the size of the state (measured by central-
government spending as a share of annual GDP) grew from a “neoliberal” average of 27 
percent at century’s end to an average of nearly 40 percent ten years later.”111  A 
significant part of this growth came in the form of social programs that are the subject of 
the next chapter. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Bolivia’s historical context is crucial to understanding the political and social 
identities of the contemporary people. The reoccurring dichotomic relationship between 
the ruling elite and the indigenous peasantry is revealed in every era of Bolivian history. 
The eras of the Inca Empire, Spanish colonialism, independence, oligarchic caudilloismo, 
the 1952 Revolution, and the decades leading up to the twenty-first century show the lack 
of consistent institutions to establish solidarity around a unified Bolivian national 
identity. An analytical comparison of the contemporary Bolivian social programs under 
plurinationalism and the social actions taken before the 2005 election will reveal whether 
identities are shifting for the diverse population toward a Bolivian national identity.   
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III. BOLIVIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
The analysis of ethnic and national identification is important in understanding 
population responses to political, economic, and social transitions in Bolivia and take up 
the first portion of this chapter. The dichotomy of centralized or decentralized control 
over broad policy changes lies at the center of Bolivia’s transition to plurinationalism. 
The second half of this chapter will examine what tensions and responses from 
opposition groups (both indigenous and non-indigenous) challenge the projected aim of 
Morales plurinational government. 
A. THE CONTRAST OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Describing the contrast between the myriad of ethnic identities that exist in 
Bolivia and the overall Bolivian national identity sought under plurinationalism produces 
an ironic and inherent tension. This tension of plurinationalism places the centralization 
of nationalism against the autonomy of many ethnic groups. The factors that create such a 
tension have existed throughout Bolivia’s history. Sharp contrast in regional features, 
linguistics, and cultural practices existed from the time of the Inca up to, a varying 
degree, contemporary Bolivia.  
The 1952 Bolivian Revolution marked the first move by a Bolivian government to 
establish universal suffrage for reasons beyond just assimilation for economic gain, as 
seen during the colonial and caudillo periods. In order to incorporate such as vast range 
of ethnic and indigenous groups, the MNR focused on programs of modernity. The ideals 
of producing a Bolivian nation composed of Bolivians built off the concepts of the 
blended peoples: mestizo and the cooperation between them, mestizaje.  
The positive view of unity though diversity offered by the MNR did not account 
for the complex reality of the how these terms and concepts differed from group to group 
and region to region. Ester Pila identifies how in the highlands the viewpoint was that, 
“mestizo [is] a sort of a national symbol against colonialism” yet it produced further 
30 
division between “mestizo-whites” and “mestizo-Indians.”112  For some groups, 
mestizaje and mestizo became synonymous with Andean urban centers and the highlands. 
The difficulty for the MNR came with maintaining the level of socialization in the rural 
and lowland areas of eastern Bolivia. The traditional gap between highland and lowland 
Bolivia continued even after the MNR tried to form a Bolivian national identity. 
When the MAS party and President Morales began forming their view of Bolivian 
plurinationalism they utilized populist strategies similar to those of the MNR during the 
1950s and 1960s. These included social programs focusing on universal healthcare and 
education, funded by nationalized extractive resource rents. The major difference 
between the MNR and the MAS are the mobilizing symbols used to foster a national 
identity and cohesion. While the MNR focused on assimilating all groups toward a 
positivist European model of nation building, the MAS party focused on the organic 
ideals of native cosmology, Pachamama (the Andean World-Mother), and a connection 
with Andean history.   
The remainder of this chapter will review further the relationship between aspects 
of ethnic and national identity in Bolivia.  
The challenge with recording subjective data, i.e., ethnic self-identification, is that 
it can change almost immediately. The bulk of information on ethnic identities and 
demographic data is provided from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 
and The Project on Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA).113     
The accessible LAPOP data runs from 1998 to the executive summary report of 
2014. The sample size for Bolivia is divided up among the nine departments of the 
country. The total amount of population surveyed ranged from 300 to 400 individuals 
112 Esther Lopez Pila, “Constructions of Tacana Indigeneity: Recognition, Race and Indigenous 
Politics in Amazonian Bolivia” (doctoral thesis, University of Sussex, 2014), 155, http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/
48891/1/Lopez_Pila%2C_Esther.pdf. 
113 Isabel Inguanzo, “Indigenous Peoples, Democracy, and Representation: The Cases of Bolivia and 
Guatemala,” Boletin Pnud & Instituto De Iberamérica no.2 (2011): 2–3. 
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across the departments, which were further divided among the municipalities of the 
departments.114   
B. ETHNIC SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
The LAPOP data recognizes the subjective nature of ethnic self-identification and 
that the term does not hold a universally accepted meaning.115  Ethnic self-identity is 
divided into two sections: indigenous group association and indigenous ethnic category. 
Indigenous group association is sampled among the largest indigenous groups, identified 
largely by linguistics and geographic region, of Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní, Chuiqitano, 
Mojeno, and others.116 The indigenous ethnic categories are divided among the social 
association of race and socioeconomic indicators and include, White, Mestizo/Chola, 
indigenous or Indian, and Black.117   
The data reveal a notable feature in Bolivian ethnic self-identification: Bolivians 
favor the ethnic identifier mestizo over any other term. The definition of mestizo as being 
mixed between indigenous and another race reflects the reality that most Bolivians 
understand they have some mixed lineage. The label mestizo also affords a greater 
chance of social mobility for the largest percentage of the population. The terms cholo, 
chola, and cholita are specific Bolivian identifiers for a mestizo person who lives in an 
urban center.118     
From the start of the LAPOP data in 1998 until 2012, ethnic self-identification 
experienced major shifts, as particularly in the number of individuals who identified as 
white and indigenous (see Figure 1).   
114 Mitchell A. Seligson, The Political Culture of Democracy in Bolivia: 1998 (Nashville, TN: 
Vanderbilt University, 1998), 21. 
115 Mitchell A. Seligson, Daniel Moreno Morales, and Vivian Schwarz Blum, Democracy Audit 
Bolivia 2004 Report (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University, 2004), 38. 
116 Mitchell A. Seligson, Abby B. Cordora, Juan Carlos Donoso, Daniel Moreno Morales, Diana 
Orcés, and Vivian Schwarz Blum, Democracy Audit: Bolivia 2006 Report (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt 
University, 2006), 15. 
117 Ibid., 16. 
118 Raúl Madrid, “Politics, Socioeconomic Status, and Indigenous Identity in Latin America: The 
Bolivian Case,” a paper presented at the 2006 meeting of Latin American Studies Association, San Juan, 
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Figure 1.  Ethnic Self-Identification119 
The greatest change in ethnic re-identification occurs during the indigenous social 
movements over the course 2002 to 2004. There is a drop in mestizo and white 
identification and a rise in indigenous identity. The mestizo slightly rises after the 
political transition and the white and indigenous begin to slightly decrease over the next 
few surveyed years. This trend is evidence of the power that political mobilization has on 
the individual identity of Bolivians. 
C. INDIGENOUS ASSOCIATION AND REGIONAL ASSOCIATION 
Indigenous group identification is primarily with of the two largest groups, 
Aymara or Quechua, with slight increases in identification with the smaller indigenous 
groups, Guaraní, Chuiqitano, Mojeno, and others.   
The growth of indigenous identification correlates positively with departmental 
representation as well. The political context validates the ethnic/indigenous identities and 
then produces stronger identities within a region and department. Respondents who 
                                                 
119 Adapted from “LAPOP data from yearly reports starting from 1998–2012,” Nashville, TN: 
Vanderbilt University. Data from 2002 excluded due to insufficient specific data on ethnic percentages. 
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identify most with their departments are more likely to associate themselves with a 
national community and identify themselves as Bolivians. The 2006 LAPOP report states 
and Figure 2 demonstrates that, “The sense of belonging to something smaller, like a 
department or particular cultural group, seems to be generating the conditions for people 
to feel part of the national community.”120   
 
Figure 2.  Intensity of Cultural and Regional Identification, by Intensity of 
National Identity121 
From 2006–2010, there was a continued rise in national identification and a 
decrease in departmental identification. The first few years of the Morales’ presidency 
established the populist political and economic features of nationalization in extractive 
energy industries that enabled redistributive social programs. In 2010, however, there was 
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a sharp transition from national identification back to departmental identity. This shift in 
identity occurred after the 2009 Bolivian Constitution took effect and the struggle 
escalated between the central government and regions over autonomous control of 
hydrocarbons. Indigenous rights to territorially extracted resources were established well 
before the 2009 Constitution. Isabella Radhuber identifies four key legal acts that 
established indigenous rights: Bolivia’s 1991 ratification of Convention 169 of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), the 1994 Bolivian Constitution (establishing the 
right to collective land titles, or Tierras Comnitarias de Origen (TCO), the 2005 
Hydrocarbon Laws (mandating indigenous representation in decision making on 
hydrocarbon and environmental practices), and the 2006 Pacto de Unidad which 
reinforced indigenous rights regarding the management of resources and compensation 
for their extraction.122   
The 2009 Constitution offers a suggestion of rights to indigenous involvement in 
extractive resource management. Article 30 of the Bolivian Constitution recognizes, “the 
right and obligatory consultation [of indigenous peoples] is respected and guaranteed, it 
is performed by the state, undertaken in good faith and in an agreed manner, regarding 
the use of non-renewable resources in the territories.”123  The terms “good faith” and 
“agreed manner” imply an expectation of cooperation between the central government 
and indigenous communities. The Article goes on to support cultural rights and 
involvement with the decision process over non-renewable resources. Radhuber, 
however, highlights an essential element missing that would nationally validate the 
legitimacy of indigenous participation: indigenous communities’ right to veto extraction 
contracts.124  Article 359 reinforces the lack of teeth in indigenous involvement in the 
determination of resource actions within their indigenous territory; it states, “The 
state…exercises the right of possession and production of natural gas throughout the 
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country and is the only entity authorized to commercialize the resource. The totality of 
incomes obtained by the commercialization of natural gas will be owned by the state.”125     
D. LEVELS OF VICTIMIZATION AND SOCIAL PROTEST 
Tensions over Bolivian hydrocarbons coincide with long-established attitudes of 
East/West and Highland/Lowland cultural distinctions. Within Bolivia, the Western 
urban capitals composed of Aymara and Quechua indigenous identities constitutes the 
majority support for “pro-MAS” centralized government, while the East, designated the 
“Media Luna” or half-moon (see Figure 3), strongly defends autonomous Tierra 
Comunitarias de Origen (Communal Lands of Origin) rights toward territorial 
hydrocarbons.126   
The Guaraní make up the majority of the indigenous groups that inhabit the rural 
oil territories in the departments of Tarija, Chuquisaca, and Santa Cruz.127  Gustafson 
quotes a Guaraní individual as saying that, “At least with the multinationals [private oil 
companies], we knew we had the enemy in front of us. Now the state is all around us.”128 
The expansion of exploration for further extractive resource sites has produced further 
tensions and indigenous/rural grievances, over cultural and environmental land rights. 
Such complaints sparked, two major protests: the Marcha Por la Defensa del Territorio, 
la Autonomia y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indigenas (March for the Defense of the 
Territory, autonomy and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) by the CIDOB (Confederation 
of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia) in 2010 and the “March por el TIPNIS” (March 
through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory), and the “North 
Indigenous March in 2012.”129     
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Figure 3.  The “Media Luna” (darker areas of the map)130 
Protests are the norm of expression in Bolivian civil society. There is a strong 
historical tradition of active protesting that spurs mass involvement from all departments 
and social sectors of the Bolivian population. The rise in public protest since 2010 
reflects the inefficiencies of government institutions and feelings of victimization.   
While Bolivian identities are divided along the lines of indigenous versus non-
indigenous representation and centralized versus regional economic resource control, the 
ideal of normative democratic representation and involvement is shared across 
Bolivia.131  
The next chapter considers whether social programs funded by energy rents have 
helped to consolidate Bolivian society around a national consciousness or whether they 
have maintained or worsened the existing regional and ethnic divisions documented in 
this chapter. 
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IV. BOLIVIA’S SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
A. SOCIAL PROGRAMS AND NATIONAL POLITICS 
The social programs enacted both before and after 2005 focused largely on two 
areas: healthcare and expanded educational opportunities. Healthcare and education 
directly impact the daily quality of life of poor indigenous populations. Nor were 
universal suffrage and acknowledgment of primary grievances of the suppressed majority 
in Bolivia by the revolutionary governments of the MNR and MAS based solely on 
altruism. Both parties utilized class and ethnic tensions across the broader Bolivian 
population to gain political power. Further analysis in each of the time frames will note 
the positive and negative outcomes, with respect to national cohesion, of the programs 
the parties utilized to bolster national and political support. 
B. BOLIVIAN SOCIAL PROGRAMS PRE-2005 
This section analyzes government social program under the MNR government 
from 1952 to 1964. Prior to the national revolution, social welfare support came solely 
from traditional institutions, such as the Catholic Church, and indigenous cultural 
practices.  
The MNR employed an ideology of revolutionary political, economic, and social 
change. The merging of all these interests into one national view of Bolivia had never 
existed prior to the 1952 Revolution. James Malloy recognizes three primary 
characteristics needed for a successful state revolution: “(1) an anti-status quo elite placed 
at the middle or upper middle levels of stratification, (2) a mobilized mass formed as the 
result of the revolution of expectations, and (3) an ideology or a widespread emotional 
state to help communication between leaders and followers and to create collective 
enthusiasm.”132  All three seemed to exist in 1952. The MNR expanded its support 
through populist actions and promises across a large horizontal constituency of labor 
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unions, urban middle classes, and indigenous peasantry.133  The nationalization of the 
mining industry and the Decree of Land Reform of 1953 established higher involvement 
for the broader classes of workers and peasant farmers.134  The change of power from the 
hacienda system empowered the lower socioeconomic classes to demand further 
development of opportunities to satisfy basic needs in education and health care. 
The MNR’s assumption was that by accomplishing the primary objectives of 
securing national control of the mining industry and overthrowing the traditional 
oligarchic elite, all social grievances, specifically those from indigenous communities, 
would fall away over time. The MNR, however, had to react almost immediately to those 
indigenous pressures that did match the primary objectives of the Revolution. Malloy 
notes that, “whatever the history of protest activity, the Indian played no role to speak of 
in the insurrection of April 1952.”135  However, shortly thereafter, protest activity spread 
with incredible rapidity throughout the countryside, and the Indian quickly became a 
political actor of the first magnitude.136  
The indigenous communities’ demand for expanded education, particularly in the 
rural areas of the country, began after the Chaco War and “military socialism” 
governments of the 1940s.137  The pressure from the indigenous peasantry for 
educational access served a dual purpose for the MNR: Education gave rural lower 
socioeconomic classes the perception of social mobility, and created further political 
support for the MNR. Hylton and Thomson note that, “Taken together, land distribution, 
the creation of MNR peasant trade unions and rural schools, and voting rights gave the 
MNR something like a hegemony over the indigenous peasant communities and 
individual smallholders.”138     
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The education programs implemented by the MNR government, however, 
focused largely on redefining the cultural identities of the indigenous peasantry. Molly 
Geidel analyzes the role education played in the developing economic and political 
relations the MNR established with the United States. The United States, as part of its 
Cold War policy of containment, sought to prevent communist ideals and practices 
spreading in Latin America. It bolstered U.S. companies’ tin contracts with Bolivia and 
pushed the MNR toward anti-communist programs. State-supported education was a 
prime avenue to accomplish this. The MNR focused on elevating what Silvia Rivera 
calls, the “urbanized ‘gente decente’ (mestizo), [and] suppressing not only the indigenous 
radicalism…but all vestiges of indigenous culture.”139  Education remained as a keystone 
in indigenous communities’ abilities to expand self-determination and representation, but 
under the MNR, it was viewed as a degradation of stronger indigenous cultural 
autonomy.  
Very similar indigenous attitudes arose with the implementation of the MNR 
health care program. On their face, these reforms appeared as progressive efforts to 
improve rural health, particularly among women and children. The MNR health reform 
focused primarily on maternal and infant morbidity rates in indigenous communities (see 
Table 1). The MNR’s partnership with the United States supported Pan-American 
Sanitary Bureau (PASB) (now the Pan-American Health Organization), established 
health training facilities and hospital across Bolivia.140  Although, according to official 
MNR records, maternal and infant care improved in rural areas, Nicole Pacino argues that 
the MNR used false information on improved maternal and infant survivability rates to 
bolster its political image. She goes on to state that, “In 1970, the infant mortality rate 
was about 15 percent, roughly that same as the 1950s,” when twenty-five percent of rural 
babies died before age 1 (see Table 1).141   
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Table 1.   Maternal and Infant Mortality Prior to 1952 Revolution142 
1950 10% - 18% Overall Mortality Rate in Bolivia 
1950 Maternal Deaths: 8.3 / 
1000 births 
Infant Deaths: 108.7 / 1000 
births 
1953 Maternal Deaths:15.9/ 
1000 births 
Infant Deaths: 182.8/1000 
births 
Approximately 25 percent of rural babies died before their first birthday. 
 
The reforms had another outcome; they effectively stigmatized indigenous health 
practices and culture, in the name of modernization and a new Bolivian identity as a 
modern nation-state. The MNR projected its ideology of mestizaje onto women’s and 
children’s health.143  The MNR government focused on “pro-natalism”144 as a medium 
toward Bolivian nationalism. Government support focused largely on what the Bolivian 
newspaper, La Nacion, called the “greatest sanitary problem,” of indigenous birthing 
practices.145  Indigenous practices and cultures became the acknowledged obstacle on the 
path toward Bolivian modernity and national identity. Although maternal and infant care 
improved in rural areas, health service patronage (medical services exchanged for work 
or material goods) was prevalent. The lack of professional documentation, the divide 
between urban and rural levels of service, and the inability to financially maintain 
expanded health infrastructure led the MNR’s health program to fall apart.146  The lack 
of supportive infrastructure and financial instability limited the amount of care that could 
reach the isolated rural sections of the country.147  
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The MNR’s ideology of a national identity for Bolivia, dependent on state 
supported social programs, did not account for the stronger group identities of the leftist 
workers unions and indigenous communities. Malloy states that, “it is the removal of an 
obstacle which makes a revolution possible.”148  The true obstacle needed for removal 
was not the removal of the traditional elite but the inherent dependence Bolivia retained 
on outside influence. Rising inflation and a failing market economy pushed the MNR to 
side with the United States for social, economic, and political support, a dependence that 
continued for the next 50 years. This led to its failure to sustain the first and third criteria 
for Malloy’s revolution. A totally independent and inclusive Bolivian national identity 
fell to the way side. 
C.  BOLIVIAN SOCIAL PROGRAMS 2005–2013  
The decades leading up the twenty-first century in Bolivia marked an ever- 
expanding ideological and conceptual gap between a conservative government and a 
growing radicalized populous. The IMF and World Bank supported economic reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s that privatized industries that Bolivian people took great existential 
perspective from. The restructuring of the mining labor force led to the displacement of 
unionized miners to the coca fields, and the rise of the cocaleros. The cocaleros, under 
the organization of the Coca Leaf Producers’ Union,149 used a traditional symbol of 
cosmological belief and daily coca-leaf consumption to foster anti-imperialist 
attitudes.150  The 2001 “Water War” in Cochabamba and the 2003 “Gas War” of El Alto 
set the stipulations of what would become known as the “October Agenda.”151    
The culmination of the cocaleros’ social mobilization and anti-imperial views 
toward foreign economic controls was the rise of Evo Morales and the Movimiento al 
Socialismo, Movement for Socialism, or MAS party. As a primary leader in the coca 
unions, Morales knew how to leverage traditional populist concerns; he and MAS 
concentrated on majority indigenous representation in parliament. Once elected in 2005, 
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Morales focused on enacting the October Agenda: nationalization of the hydrocarbon and 
natural gas industry and the restructuring of the national Constitution.  The increase in 
global natural gas and oil prices during the early 2000s allowed for an exponential growth 
in Bolivia’s GDP and government revenues grew further under the nationalized 
stipulations.152  The revenue allowed Morales and the MAS party to attempt to spread 
horizontally their legitimacy though three energy-rent-supported social programs: Renta 
Dignidad, Bono Juancito Pinto, and Bon Juana Azurduy.153 
1. Renta Dignidad 
The Dignity Pension is a “noncontributive pension to Bolivian citizens over age 
60.”154  Renta Dignidad provides a critical service to a historically neglected sector of the 
population. The program came into existence during the Lozanda administration (First 
Presidency 1993–1997; Second Presidency 2002–2003) as part of the Bono Solidario or, 
BONOSOL, initiative to support the growing aging population among the poorest sectors 
of the country.155  Renta Dignidad became a lynch pin in the quality of life for the elderly 
community and expanded their identification with citizenship. Morales’ augmentation of 
the BONOSOL/Lozanda program included lowering the age of eligibility from 65 to 60 
and increasing the yearly pay-out to between 1,800 and 2,400 Bolivianos (US$260 and 
347).156  Bolivia, as a result has the highest percentage of pension coverage in Latin 
America (see Figure 4). Bolivians over the age of 65 currently make up six percent of the 
population, a total of 630,000 persons.157  The rent-supported pension plan is their only 
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source of income.158  Such single income dependency is accompanied by several 
challenges: the lack of official or appropriate documentation, mandatory in-person funds 
collection, scamming, identity theft, and anti-Renta Dignidad protests by the De las 
Cacerolas Vacias group. The De las Cacerolas Vacias, or “Empty Pots,” protest against 




Figure 4.  Bolivian Pension Comparison with Latin America160 
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2. Bono Juancito Pinto 
The education subsidy of Bono Juancito Pinto was the first social program 
instituted after Morales became president in 2006.161  The MAS government reiterated 
the driving need to reduce the high drop-out rate of children from primary and secondary 
schooling, occurring across Bolivia and the rest of Latin America.162  Like Renta 
Dignidad, MAS did not originate the idea for such a social program. James McGuire 
notes that the Lozanda administration established a similar plan to subsidize young 
female students enrollment in primary and secondary schooling to increase Bolivia’s 
gender parity index (GPI).163  The MAS administration’s Bono Juancito Pinto social 
subsidy, however, applies to all children who are eligible to attend primary and secondary 
school and each student receives an annual cash amount of 200 Bolivianos (US$ 
28.50).164  The program is named after a twelve-year old drummer boy who was killed 
during the War of the Pacific.165  Such symbolism ties the program with Morales’s use of 
strong emotional responses to Bolivia’s past and projection of militant nationalism.   
In reality, Bono Juancito Pinto demonstrates ineffective government quality 
assurance and support that has resulted in a worsening drop-out rate. The US$ 28.50 
given annually to each Bolivian student does not account for factors like transportation to 
the school and school supplies. A 2015 U.S. Embassy report noted the actual schooling 
costs range from “rural Sucre at US$ 141/year” to urban schools such as “El Alto at US$ 
410/year.”166  The Bolivian government claims that it has further expanded the program 
and promises future increases in funding; a harsh reality, however, is continuance of child 
labor across Bolivia. The United States Department of Labor notes that Bolivia’s children 
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are “engaged in the worst forms of child labor, including in agriculture and in mining.”167  
With regard to primary schooling, the out-of-school-children numbers jumped from 
27,530 in 2009 to 169,291 in 2013.168  The small cash incentives of Bono Juancito Pinto 
in 2010 totaled US$ 54 million, given to 1.6 million children, which equated to only 0.25 
percent of Bolivia’s GDP.169  Moreover, MAS has used these for electioneering: 
McGuire recounts how during the 2009 presidential election cycle distribution of public 
cash transfers for Bono Juancito Pinto coincided with the political campaigning of the 
MAS party.   
3. Bono Juana Azurduy 
Before the presidential election of 2009, President Morales enacted Supreme 
Decree 0066 that established a maternal and infant child social program. Bono Juana 
Azurduy, like the Bono Juancito Pinto, takes as its namesake a historical figure. A mother 
and freedom fighter in the independence movement against the Spanish Empire, Azurduy 
is a popular symbol of resistance and tenacity, who is valued across the Andes.170  The 
Azurduy program was created out of other health programs concerned with mother/infant 
support and malnutrition of young children. The support for these programs came from 
international institutions that include the World Bank (funding the Zero Malnutrition 
Program), Inter-American Development Bank, United Nations World Food Program, and 
United Nations Population Fund.171   
In 2013, the program documented 409,778 mothers and 598,358 children that 
benefited from the payment of 1,820 Bolivianos or US$260 over the gestation period and 
birth of the child (see Table 2). The requirements for the pregnant women to receive these 
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funds include attending educational activities, complying with doctors’ 
recommendations, and prenatal checkups conducted at an approved health center.172     
Table 2.   Bono Juana Azurduy Financial Support173 






1st Prenatal 50 BOB/$7.31  
 
320 BOB/$46.81 
2nd Prenatal 50 BOB/$7.31 
3rd Prenatal 50 BOB/$7.31 
4th Prenatal 50 BOB/$7.31 
Institutional Birth 
Postnatal 
120 BOB / $17.55 




Care for Child 
125 BOB/$18.28 
every 2 months 
1,500 BOB/$219.40 
 Total 1,820BOB/ $266.21 
*Bolivian Boliviano to U.S. dollar based on 2016 exchange rates. 
 
The positive trends in child survivability to age 5 and maternal mortality ratios 
indicate the effectiveness of these health and nutrition programs. Child mortality under 5 
years old per 1000 live births dropped from 61.4 in 2005 to 38.4 in 2015. The percentage 
of underweight children less than 5 years old fell from 5.9 percent in 2004 to 4.5 percent 
in 2008. The maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births also fell from 334 in 2000 to 
206 in 2015. As of 2010, Bolivia received a total of U.S. $73 million in Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) for health, with US$ 13.3 million designated for 
reproductive health and family planning. Bolivia receives the highest amount of ODA in 
South America.174  
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D.  THE CHALLENGES OF BOLIVIA’S SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
From the inception of the social programs of Bono Juana Azurduy, Bono Juancito 
Pinto, and Renta Dignidad, some positive changes in health, education, and elderly 
support have occurred. These programs were modeled on the conditional cash transfer 
programs (CCTs) of Brazil (Bolsa Escola and Bolsa Familia) and Mexico (Progresa).175  
CCTs are a popular form in distributing social funds to the poor because of the perception 
that cash in hand cannot be corrupted or taken away; in reality, these programs are 
connected to incumbent political power and campaigning. Díaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 
note that CCTs in Latin America are “discretionary…politicians can start, stop, or 
otherwise change benefits across the board by decree.”176  Whether this applies to 
Bolivia remains to be seen.   
In Bolivia, the rents from hydrocarbon and mining industries are portrayed by the 
Morales and the MAS as “the patrimony of all Bolivians,” which legitimizes the 
universality of the programs.177  Morales Escoffier, quoted in McGuire’s essay, argues 
that,  
Bolivians have evolved sense of ownership over the CCTs and other social 
assistance programs, which are no longer considered a temporary public 
benefit, but rather an acquired human right, which means that the 
population will demand that these programs are continued at any cost.178   
The Bolivian government faces a steep challenge, as these social programs that depend 
on the international energy market. These social programs address socio-economic class 
issues, not the expanding social and political grievances of indigenous autonomy and 
strong central government control. 
Bolivia’s CCT social programs are tied directly to the international energy 
market. When oil and hydrocarbon prices are high, as they were in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the coffers hold larger reserves for social programs, but when the market 
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falls, so does the social investment. Aside from the inherent volatility in revenue, the true 
deficiencies lie with the governmental support system. Much like the precariousness of 
Bolivia’s largely global market dependent extractive economy, the budget for social CCT 
programs are not legally fixed in the country’s constitution or other legal documentation. 
Bolivia also lacks the expansive quality assurance and managerial programs need to reach 
the entire country.   
The “demand side” for social programs is alive and well in a population that has 
developed a strong representative attitude toward civil society.179  The lack of 
transparency in the delineation of what assistance goes where and corrective data analysis 
suggests that these programs are susceptible to political manipulation even though all 
Bolivians who qualify can receive the support. Díaz-Cayeros and Magalon use the term 
“Reverse Robin Hood effect” to show how social programs are given to the poor for 
reciprocal political support.180  This does not necessarily sow feelings of national unity.  
Bolivian national cohesion has experienced extreme peaks and valleys over the 
last 60 years since the 1952 Revolution. The MNR viewed national cohesion along the 
lines of class modernization and bringing the indigenous communities up to the same 
quality of life and practices of creoles and mestizos. The MAS government views 
national cohesion as ethnic and political reinforcement for central political control.   
Both the MNR and MAS have used redistributive strategies through social 
programs in pensions, education, and maternal-infant health care to spread legitimacy of 
their political control.   
The MNR failed to maintain its level of social commitment due to Bolivia’s 
dependency on the world energy market and its relationships with external actors. The 
MAS, faces similar pressures on its social support efforts. The social programs have 
produced an identity among the poorer and older demographics of the Bolivian 
population as relying on the state and being financially dependent. The expectation of 
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continued financial support from the state assumes that the Bolivian GDP and 
relationships with international institutions and donor governments will remain positive.   
These programs to date lack the detail and depth of effectiveness beyond 
individual political party strategies to gain votes. Radhuber states that, “Although the 
redistributive initiatives…provide measurable positive economic figures, they do not 
reflect serious commitment to the plural economic model described in the 
Constitution.”181  
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V. CONCLUSION 
 This thesis examined whether redistribution of natural resource wealth through 
social programs enables establishment of a durable, new, and genuinely national identity 
in Bolivia. Such an identity would encompass all Bolivians as equal participants in a 
national community with distinct historical and mythical features. The ethno-populist 
strategies of Evo Morales and the MAS party have proclaimed broad inclusion of 
Bolivians across ethnicity and socio-economic class. Led by Morales, Radhuber writes 
that, “indigenous-peasant groups developed a plurinational state project to strengthen 
indigenous-peasant self-determination, which is now inscribed in the 2009 
Constitution.”182  The political symbolism of plurinationalism seems to be consensually 
accepted by indigenous groups. Actualization of plurinationalism, however, through 
equal redistribution of rent income and central government support of ethnic group 
autonomy in local decision-making, particularly over hydrocarbon resources, has failed to 
materialize.183  As Radhuber concludes, “new indigenous resistance movements have 
emerged, demanding further control over their territories and resources.”184 
 The thesis finds that energy-rent-supported social programs have not yielded a 
cohesive national identity durable over the long-term. The establishment of redistributive 
social programs and MAS’ reiteration of blame on suppressive foreign neo-liberal 
policies have made Morales appear to be a savior of Bolivia to many citizens. MAS’ 
energy-rent-supported social programs have merely promoted short-term political support 
for Morales and his party, while regional identities appear to have strengthened, and new 
regional and identity divisions have emerged. The realistic consequences of Morales’ all-
inclusive ethnopopulism has been what Radhuber identifies as an increase in localized 
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indigenous identities and grievances, as well as increased division between peasant and 
indigenous groups.185 
Bolivia’s Left Turn toward a new state structure based on plurinationalism and 
recognition of indigenous self-determination developed into a U-Turn. A spring of social 
mobilization prepared the fertile ground for Bolivia’s first indigenous president to finally 
enable the majority of its citizens to establish what Guillermo O’Donnell labels as a 
“high-quality representative democracy.”186  The reality of new state formation has 
proved far more complex.   
Bolivia still lacks a cohesive national identity. The country is riven along 
geographic, ethnic, economic, and social lines. Bolivia still depends on extractive 
resources just as it did before there was a Bolivia. Bolivian still depends on the caudillo 
style leadership in Evo Morales. As protests and civil demonstrations have remained the 
norm, the government has become more centralized.187  Morales and his government use 
emotional appeals and coercive control of the economy to keep power.188 
Mass political support, nationalization of extractive resources, state centralization 
in a super-presidency, and the deeply ingrained traditions of patrimonialism and 
patronage have produced, however, what Mazzuca terms “rentier populism.”189 There is 
little evidence that Morales’ government is genuinely committed to the plural economic 
model outlined in his 2009 Plurinational Constitution, as he has systematically increased 
his control over the state over his time in office.190 
Instead, Bolivia under plurinationalism seems to be underscoring the finding that, 
in heterogeneous societies, economic issues are indeed ethnic issues.191  It was noted in 
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the introduction that Bolivia under Morales faces the challenges of whether 
“plurinationalism can reconcile both indigenous rights and strong state sovereignty, while 
avoiding new exclusions (and violence) associated with territorializing modes of 
ethnocultural differences and with hypernationalist states.”192  It appears clear today that 
plurinationalism has failed in this regard, and in creating greater national cohesion. 
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